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Abstract
This article argues that US counterinsurgency doctrine forms a programme of both liberal rule and liberal 
war whose ultimate purpose is the pacification of recalcitrant populations and their eventual (re)integration 
into the networks of liberal governance. Designed to promote ‘safe’ forms of life while eradicating ‘dangerous’ 
ones, the doctrine constitutes a response to both the biopolitical problematization of human (in)security and 
the geostrategic problematization of US national security. Counterinsurgency aims to harness sociocultural 
knowledge in order to conduct a form of triage between elements of targeted populations. It also seeks 
to inscribe the divisions on which such a triage is based into space by means of practices that derive from 
earlier methods of imperial policing. Ultimately, counterinsurgency’s production and implementation of a 
biopolitical differentiation between ‘safe’ and ‘dangerous’ human lives is likely not only to reinforce existing 
societal divisions within targeted populations but also to create new global, regional and local divisions and 
to generate resistance to what many people will always view as imperial domination. The societal divisions 
and resistance engendered by counterinsurgency may reinforce Western problematizations of insecurity and 
hence lead to further counterinsurgency campaigns in the future. Counterinsurgency doctrine is thus not 
so much a programme of peace and stability as one of spatially and temporally indeterminate pacification.
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Introduction
On 13 February 2010, US, Canadian, British, Danish and Estonian forces launched Operation 
Moshtarak in Afghanistan’s Helmand province – the first major assault on Taliban insurgents since 
US President Barack Obama’s decision to deploy an additional 30,000 troops in the country (BBC, 
2010a). Operation Moshtarak (which means ‘together’ in the local Dari language) differed from 
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earlier attacks on Taliban strongholds in that, contrary to the common military practice of trying to 
maintain an element of surprise, the local population was informed about the impending offensive. 
Several weeks prior to the launch of the operation, Afghan government officials and Western troops 
sought to persuade locals to throw in their lot with the Afghan central government and its Western 
backers (Gardner, 2010). Although the first days of the operation were overshadowed by reports of 
civilian casualties, the operation was said to have been designed with the express purpose of avoid-
ing civilian deaths (BBC, 2010b). US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen 
(2010) asserted that Operation Moshtarak was more than just a conventional military offensive:
There’s great focus on – and [Afghan] President Karzai has made this point, and I think this is critical – on 
having – we would like to have no civilian causalities. I mean, this is focused on the people. This is not 
focused on the Taliban. And it is a strategy that will not just clear the area, but that will hold it and then 
build right behind it. So there’s a civilian component here, and there’s a local governance piece, which is 
going to be installed immediately, as well.
Operation Moshtarak was meant to showcase ‘the new “counter-insurgency” approach of US and 
NATO commander Gen Stanley McChrystal’ (BBC, 2010a; see also McChrystal, 2009).1 The 
operation was based on a counterinsurgency-style clear–hold–build model that was aimed at pro-
viding security, development and good governance to the local population, rather than merely kill-
ing insurgents.
However, as Operation Moshtarak progressed and US-led NATO forces seized the largely rural 
area of Marja,2 Robert Watkins, deputy special representative for the UN secretary-general, openly 
criticized what he saw as the ‘militarization of aid’ in Afghanistan, stating that ‘we do not wish to 
be part of that process because we would not want to have the humanitarian activities we deliver to 
be linked with military activity’ (quoted in Tran, 2010). Such isolated criticisms notwithstanding, 
humanitarian aid and development efforts have become closely tied to (mostly Western) security 
concerns. In fact, a growing number of academics, policymakers and aid workers agree that secu-
rity and development are interconnected (see Duffield, 2005, 2007, 2008, 2010; Hettne, 2010; 
Stern and Öjendal, 2010).
According to Mark Duffield (2008: 146), security and development have merged into a poten-
tially global strategy for the management of at-risk and risky populations – a biopolitical contain-
ment strategy ‘that seek[s] to restrict or manage the circulation of incomplete and hence potentially 
threatening life’ (see also Duffield, 2003, 2005, 2007, 2010). Duffield even goes so far as to assert 
that ‘liberal practices of development traditionally associated with NGOs have been rediscovered 
as essentially civilian forms of counterinsurgency’ (Duffield, 2008: 157; see also Slim, 2004). The 
attempt to control and contain flows of risky life is also one of the major objectives of the global 
pacification efforts that, according to Michael Dillon and Julian Reid (2009), characterize ‘the lib-
eral way of war’. What is more, ‘the liberal way of war’ is inextricably intertwined with ‘the liberal 
way of rule’ and its biopolitical ‘commitment to making life live’ (Dillon and Reid, 2009: 11).
Indeed, the relevance of Michel Foucault’s ideas of biopower and biopolitics to critical analyses 
of ‘the liberal problematic of security’ has been amply demonstrated (Evans, 2010: 414, 428; see 
also Dillon and Neal, 2008; Dillon and Reid, 2009; Duffield, 2007; Edkins et al., 2004). These 
largely theoretical analyses, however, should be complemented by more empirical interrogations 
of the actual governmental programmes by means of which biopolitical imperatives are supposed 
to be implemented on the ground. In other words, we should also attend to the design and deploy-
ment of specific governmental rationalities meant to respond to a biopolitical problematization of 
human (in)security.
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This article deals with one such programme. It sets out to show that US counterinsurgency doc-
trine is a rationality of both rule and warfare whose ultimate purpose is the pacification of recalci-
trant populations and their eventual (re)integration into the networks of liberal governance. First, 
the article will argue that US counterinsurgency doctrine forms a response to both the biopolitical 
problematization of ‘human security’ and the geostrategic problematizations of US national secu-
rity. In a security environment said to be defined by the global circulation of threats emanating 
from so-called ungoverned spaces, the imperatives of human security and the goals of US national 
security are frequently supposed to coincide. Second, the article will demonstrate how counterin-
surgency doctrine aims to harness sociocultural knowledge in order to conduct a form of triage 
between elements of targeted populations, and how the divisions on which such a triage is based 
are inscribed into space by means of practices that derive from earlier methods of imperial polic-
ing. Ultimately, counterinsurgency’s production and implementation of a biopolitical differentia-
tion between ‘safe’ and ‘dangerous’ life is likely not only to reinforce existing societal divisions 
within targeted populations, but also to create new global, regional and local divisions and to 
generate resistance to what many people will always view as imperial domination. The societal 
divisions and resistance engendered by counterinsurgency may reinforce Western problematiza-
tions of insecurity and hence lead to further counterinsurgency campaigns in the future. 
Counterinsurgency doctrine is thus not so much a programme of peace and stability as one of 
spatially and temporally indeterminate pacification.
Counterinsurgency revamped
We are opposed around the world by a monolithic and ruthless conspiracy that relies primarily on covert 
means for expanding its sphere of influence – on infiltration instead of invasion, on subversion instead of 
elections, on intimidation instead of free choice, on guerrillas by night instead of armies by day. (Kennedy, 
1961: 336)
John F. Kennedy’s obsession with guerrilla warfare is well documented. Roger Hilsman (1967: 
413), a key aide and foreign policy adviser to Kennedy, wrote that one of the first questions 
Kennedy put to his aides after his inauguration as president was, ‘What are we doing about guer-
rilla warfare?’ Kennedy took a strong personal lead in pushing for a programme aimed at counter-
ing guerrilla warfare in particular and what he saw as a ‘monolithic and ruthless conspiracy’ in 
general (see Blaufarb, 1977; McClintock, 1992; Shafer, 1988). Kennedy’s obsession immediately 
led to a flurry of activities at all levels of the US national security apparatus: seminars and courses 
on counterinsurgency; major efforts at bureaucratic restructuring; and the frenetic formulation of 
new policies and doctrine. In 1962, the Kennedy administration promulgated its Overseas Internal 
Defense Policy (US Government, 1962) – a comprehensive counterinsurgency programme that 
sought to merge security and development into a coherent policy geared towards containing the 
threat of communism. Yet, following the US defeat in Vietnam, counterinsurgency quickly faded 
into doctrinal oblivion and US military strategy shifted back to more conventional concerns.
These days, however, counterinsurgency (COIN) is once again fashionable among policymak-
ers, members of the armed forces, Pentagon officials and civilian academics. Indeed, counterinsur-
gency is now widely touted not only as an instrument for defeating Iraqi or Afghan insurgents but 
also as a panacea for fighting global terrorism (Cassidy, 2006; Kilcullen, 2005, 2009; Nagl, 2007; 
for a critique, see Bacevich, 2010). So, what is counterinsurgency all about?
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The new U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, which was introduced in 
2006 and published by the University of Chicago Press in 2007 (I will refer to the latter edition 
throughout this article), defines insurgency as ‘an organized, protracted politico-military struggle 
designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or 
other political authority while increasing insurgent control’. Counterinsurgency in turn is defined 
as ‘military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a govern-
ment to defeat insurgency’ (US Department of the Army, 2007: 2). What becomes immediately 
obvious is that counterinsurgency doctrine ought to be understood as a programme of both rule and 
warfare that seeks to assemble humans, technologies, tactics and modes of knowledge (production) 
into an ambiguous machine geared towards pacifying ungoverned spaces and populations that 
more often than not tend to be located in the post-colonial south.
This pacification effort hinges on providing security to the local population while (re)building 
the politico-economic infrastructure that would ultimately enable the so-called host nation to gov-
ern itself. Moreover, the provision of security and development is supposed to occur against the 
backdrop of an overall battle over perceptions to be waged through effective information opera-
tions (US Department of the Army, 2007). According to the current field manual, ‘the primary 
objective of any COIN operation is to foster development of effective governance by a legitimate 
government’ (US Department of the Army, 2007: 37). What is thus at stake in counterinsurgency is 
government.
According to Michel Foucault (2000: 341), government aims to act on somebody else’s actions 
– or, in Foucault’s own words, ‘to structure the possible field of action of others’. Government 
involves knowledge, expertise and representations concerning both the objects and the activity of 
government, as well as technologies, techniques, instruments and tactics by means of which the 
day-to-day business of governing is actually conducted (see Dean, 1999; Larner and Walters, 2004; 
Rose and Miller, 1992). Government is thus characterized by the interrelations between rationali-
ties or programmes – ‘deliberate and relatively systematic forms of thought’ – and specific ‘regimes 
of practices’ (Dean, 1999: 32, 27, 28; see also Rose and Miller, 1992; Miller and Rose, 2008). 
Government therefore operates within the frame of what Foucault termed ‘governmentality’ and 
constitutes a mode of power that cuts across ‘the problematics of consensus and will on the one 
hand and conquest and war on the other’ (Lemke, 2000: 4; see also Foucault, 2003, 2007).
Military theorist Carl von Clausewitz (1976: 83) famously described war as ‘an act of force to 
compel our enemy to do our will’. But, in contemporary unconventional warfare the use of force is 
just one particular channel for imposing one’s will on the enemy. In what Thomas X. Hammes 
(2006: 207–8) calls ‘fourth-generation warfare’ (4GW), which he describes as ‘an evolved form of 
insurgency’, war has shifted from the industrial-scale destruction of one’s opponent’s armed forces 
to undermining the political will of enemy decisionmakers through both violent and nonviolent 
means. In fact, war can no longer be clearly distinguished from nonviolent forms of imposing one’s 
will on others. Likewise, the traditional divide between crime and war and the concomitant divi-
sion between domestic public safety and foreign defence has become increasingly fuzzy (see 
Feldman, 2004). Thus, what Anthony Giddens (1987) called the internal pacification of society has 
bled into the defence against external threats, and vice versa. Indeed, as Hardt and Negri (2004: 7) 
suggest, ‘war seems to have seeped back and flooded the entire social field’.
When Foucault (2003: 15) inverted Clausewitz’s (1976: 99) famous dictum that war is ‘a con-
tinuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means’ in order to frame the problematic of 
political power as the ‘continuation of war by other means’, he sought to draw out the war-like force 
relations that persist even within internally pacified societies. Yet, Foucault’s later focus on 
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‘government’ was a move both beyond the juridical conception of power as repression and his own 
earlier bellicose notion of power as domination (Dean, 1999). In Foucault’s (2000: 341) own words:
The relationship proper to power would therefore be sought not on the side of violence or of struggle, nor 
on that of voluntary contracts (all of which can, at best, only be instruments of power) but, rather, in the 
area of that singular mode of action, neither warlike nor juridical, which is government.
Government in the Foucauldian sense of acting on somebody else’s actions thus always consists of 
and constantly shifts between relations of both coercion and consent. In counterinsurgency, this ten-
sion between coercion and consent also operates across the divide between internal pacification and 
external defence. Combining the use of force with the engineering of consent through development 
and so-called information operations, counterinsurgency seeks to internally pacify foreign societies 
in order to check the global flow of threats and thereby also secure already pacified societies.
Indeed, counterinsurgency doctrine has been presented not only as a fix to the steadily deterio-
rating post-invasion security situations in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also as a much more general 
programme aimed at transforming US security capabilities in the face of a specific biopolitical 
problematization of human (in)security. But, what are the referent objects of this problematization 
of security and danger?
Human security and biopolitical imperialism
The post-Cold War period has witnessed a conceptual shift from traditional state-centred security 
to so-called human security (Commission on Human Security, 2003; see also De Larrinaga and 
Doucet, 2008; Duffield, 2008, 2010; Hettne, 2010; Manwaring, 2005; Stern and Öjendal, 2010; 
Makaremi, 2010). Human security is broadly defined as processes for protecting ‘people from 
critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations’ and for ‘creating political, 
social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the build-
ing blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity’ (Commission on Human Security, 2003: 4). The 
notion of human security is deeply biopolitical in that it seeks to promote species-life and protect 
it from threats arising from species-life itself (De Larrinaga and Doucet, 2008; Duffield, 2008).
Moreover, as human security is now frequently presented as a ‘response to the narrative of 
global chaos’, it also provides impetus to a new militarized interventionism (Makaremi, 2010: 
108). Mary Kaldor, one of the most vociferous proponents of human security, states that ‘“bad 
neighborhoods” like the Horn of Africa, the Upper Nile, the Middle East, the Caucasus, and Central 
Asia’ provide breeding grounds for violence that could spread into the world’s ‘good neighbor-
hoods’, ‘through refugees and displaced persons, through transnational criminal activities; and 
through polarizing activities’ (Kaldor and Beebe, 2010: 37; see also Glasius and Kaldor, 2005; 
Kaldor, 1999). There is a considerable overlap between Kaldor’s global distribution of ‘bad neigh-
borhoods’ and the Pentagon’s ‘arc of instability’ that stretches from Africa through the Middle East 
all the way to Central and Southeast Asia. Thomas Barnett’s (2004) idea of the ‘Gap’ is even more 
extensive and also includes wide swathes of Central America and the Caribbean. Yet, the funda-
mental logic remains the same: a division of the globe into an integrated metropolitan system of 
stable states, on the one hand, and a kind of peripheral global borderlands marked by failed and 
failing states, violence, crime, corruption, etc., on the other.
Counterinsurgency doctrine is held up as an effective remedy to the global spread of violence 
and instability. General David Petraeus, one of the chief architects of US counterinsurgency 
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strategy, told Mary Kaldor that counterinsurgency and human security are pretty much the same 
because both cluster around the ‘two key principles’ of providing security and vital services to the 
population and separating ‘the reconcilables from the irreconcilables’ (quoted in Kaldor and Beebe, 
2010: 68). Although she comes out in support of the US military’s recent move towards counterin-
surgency, Mary Kaldor, however, maintains that there remain significant differences between 
counterinsurgency and human security:
In counterinsurgency, human security, or population security, is a tactic, not a strategy. The end goal is not 
the security of Afghans or Iraqis – that is a means to an end. The end goal is the defeat of America’s 
enemies, a point that General Petraeus and others frequently repeat. (Kaldor and Beebe, 2010: 73)
In effect, Kaldor argues that counterinsurgency is not biopolitical enough, because it remains an 
instrument of US geostrategy.
Yet, most proponents of counterinsurgency doctrine suggest that in the face of global circula-
tions of violence and instability US geostrategic goals largely overlap with the pursuit of human 
security. For instance, in the Introduction to the University of Chicago Press edition of the 
Counterinsurgency Field Manual, Sarah Sewall (2007: xlii), director of Harvard’s Carr Human 
Rights Center, argues that with the disappearance of the stabilizing framework of the Cold War, the 
major security challenge for the United States now consists in ‘buttressing multiple failing state 
structures to legitimize the interstate system’. According to Sewall (2007: xxxvii), this requires 
(re)building the capacities of fledgling states through a combination of military and civilian means:
U.S. unwillingness to govern other nations is, in this account, a fatal national flaw. The field manual 
stresses the importance of effectively employing nonmilitary power. It is not a responsibility that can be 
left to a beleaguered host nation. Counterinsurgents must harness the ordinary administrative functions to 
the fight, providing personnel, resources, and expertise.
For Sewall (2007: xlii), in order to meet the ‘strategic challenge’ of stabilization, the United States 
has to get into the business of governing nations that are deemed unable to govern themselves.
Moreover, Mark Duffield (2008: 149) points out that ‘while [human security] prioritizes the secu-
rity of people rather than states, it privileges the state as vital for providing the public goods that 
constitute human security’. Indeed, the discourse of human security has it that if certain states are 
unable to provide security for their populations, other more powerful states have a moral duty to 
intervene, secure the targeted population and develop the host nation’s capacities so that it may even-
tually be able to secure its own population. In fact, the discourse of human security both legitimizes 
and entails a biopolitical form of imperialism. This form of imperialism is driven not so much by 
limited national geopolitical ambitions (although they still play a major role) as by the unlimited aim 
of securing humanity from its own inherent threats. Since its objectives are boundless, biopolitical 
imperialism’s campaigns of pacification also tend to be both spatially and temporally indeterminate. 
And counterinsurgency doctrine forms a concrete governmental programme of biopolitical imperial-
ism insofar as it is presented as a therapy for particular pathologies of insecurity and danger.
A ‘therapy’ for ungoverned spaces
So-called ungoverned spaces – also often referred to as ‘failed’, ‘failing’ or ‘weak’ states – and 
their unruly populations are among some of the most significant referent objects of discourses of 
both human security and US national security (Kilcullen, 2005, 2009; Sewall, 2007).
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The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, which will be the chief blueprint for US military 
planning and budgetary allocations for the next couple of years, asserts that ‘the changing interna-
tional environment will continue to put pressure on the modern state system, likely increasing the 
frequency and severity of the challenges associated with chronically fragile states’ (US Department 
of Defense, 2010: 32). In this environment, the US military can no longer simply rely on its formi-
dable conventional arsenal but must develop the capabilities to mount a series of low-intensity 
operations across the global south:
The wars we are fighting today and assessments of the future security environment together demand that 
the United States retain and enhance a whole-of-government capability to succeed in large-scale 
counterinsurgency (COIN), stability, and counterterrorism (CT) operations in environments ranging from 
densely populated urban areas and mega-cities, to remote mountains, deserts, jungles, and littoral 
regions…. Accordingly, the U.S. Armed Forces will continue to require capabilities to create a secure 
environment in fragile states in support of local authorities and, if necessary, to support civil authorities in 
providing essential government services, restoring emergency infrastructure, and supplying humanitarian 
relief. (US Department of Defense, 2010: 43)
In this context, counterinsurgency forms a particularly significant programme insofar as it is 
designed to cut across the divide between civilian assistance and military intervention in order to 
address especially problematic cases of state failure. Indeed, counterinsurgency seems to combine 
what Duffield (2010) calls ‘the liberal way of development’ with what Dillon and Reid (2009) call 
‘the liberal way of war’. The liberal way of development seeks to foster ‘adaptive patterns of 
household and communal self-reliance in the global south’, while the liberal way of war is aimed 
at securing global life itself from those ‘patterns of self-reliance’ that are viewed as threats to global 
(liberal) life (Duffield, 2010: 55–6, 68; Dillon and Reid, 2009).
Counterinsurgency is supposed to rid particular regions of ‘forms of radical autonomy and 
emergence [that] are deemed to be a risk to the system as a whole’, while establishing and promot-
ing modes of ‘adaptive self-reliance’ that are viewed as safe (Duffield, 2010: 68). The latter task is 
often relegated to nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations that are expected to oper-
ate under the military umbrella of what the Counterinsurgency Field Manual calls ‘unity of effort’:
All organizations contributing to a COIN operation should strive, or be persuaded to strive, for maximum 
unity of effort. Informed, strong leadership forms the foundation for achieving it. Leadership in this area 
focuses on the central problems affecting the local populace. A clear understanding of the desired end state 
should infuse all efforts, regardless of the agencies or individuals charged with their execution. (US 
Department of the Army, 2007: 57)
Counterinsurgency’s reliance on a deeply biopolitical problematization of security and danger 
as well as its commitment to eradicating risky forms of life while promoting safe ones are best 
illustrated by the writings of David Kilcullen, former senior counterinsurgency adviser to General 
Petraeus. Kilcullen (2009: 35–38) argues that international terrorist groups, most notably Al-Qaeda, 
‘opportunistically exploit existing breakdowns in the rule of law, poor governance, or pre-existing 
conflict. Terrorist infection is thus part of the social pathology of broader societal breakdown, state 
weakness, and humanitarian crisis’. Although Kilcullen makes a number of points about terrorism 
in general, much of his discussion centres on Al-Qaeda, which he considers to be at the heart of a 
globalized insurgency against the West. What he calls the ‘accidental guerrilla syndrome’ sets in 
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with the ‘infection’ of ungoverned spaces by Al-Qaeda. It then proceeds to the ‘contagion phase’, 
in which Al-Qaeda uses these safe havens to spread propaganda and launch terrorist attacks. In the 
‘intervention phase’, external forces, most likely Western powers led by the United States, decide 
to take military action. This leads to the so-called rejection phase, in which the local population 
rejects the foreign intervention and enters into alliance with Al-Qaeda:
Again, I use medical analogy advisedly here. The rejection phase looks a lot like a social version of an 
immune response in which the body rejects the intrusion of a foreign object, even one (such as a pin in a 
broken bone or a stent in a blocked blood vessel) that serves an ultimately beneficial purpose.
Kilcullen’s use of medical tropes is highly illustrative. Indeed, processes of state failure are often 
presented in terms of pathology. Medical tropes shift the terms of debate from the political to the 
ultimately technocratic terrain of fixing social pathologies through the outside intervention of agents 
whose superior expertise and superior values are taken for granted (McFalls, 2010: 318–19). Any 
debate about whether to intervene in the first place is thereby effectively forestalled – the only debate 
that is still possible is one about the ‘how’ of intervention. This holds also true for Kilcullen’s The 
Accidental Guerrilla. Even though Kilcullen acknowledges that outside interventions may well exac-
erbate processes of radicalization, he fails to question the utility of intervention per se. He merely 
concerns himself with devising politico-military instruments that do not feed the ‘accidental guerrilla 
syndrome’. In fact, Kilcullen takes the necessity of outside intervention for granted, because he 
assumes that something has to be done about ‘terrorist infection’. He does not ask the question as to 
whether the initial ‘infection’ might have been an ‘immune response’ to earlier Western interference.
Kilcullen’s arguments about the growth of cancerous terror cells in ungoverned spaces are pro-
foundly biopolitical. In his analysis of the ‘technical armature and rhetoric of counterinsurgency’ 
in Iraq, Derek Gregory (2010: 277) suggests that ‘the emphasis on danger, or on what Foucault 
called “dangerousness”, is vital to the development of a martial biopolitics’. What Gregory calls 
‘martial biopolitics’ is nothing but a global liberal strategy of pacification and stabilization geared 
towards securing humanity from threats emanating from within humanity (Dillon and Reid, 2009). 
These threats are inevitably problematized in terms of pathologies and therapies:
Every account of life is therefore contoured by its allied discourse of danger, every account of order is 
contoured by an account of the disorder which threatens it. The biopolitics of liberal rule and war differs 
only in the account that it gives of ordered and disordered life and is self-endangering. To employ a 
medical term which therefore fits this condition of rule precisely, the emergency of emergence requires a 
form of global triage. Global triage specifies who gets what treatment, where, when and how. Some of that 
treatment – a lot of that treatment – is directly and indirectly lethal. (Dillon and Reid, 2009: 89–90)
Counterinsurgency is thus envisaged as a specific therapeutic programme for the actual implemen-
tation of ‘global triage’. This is exactly what Kilcullen suggests. He contends that the ‘accidental 
guerrilla syndrome’ can be countered by way of a global therapeutic strategy aimed at extending 
stable governmental structures into ungoverned spaces while disrupting terrorist networks – what 
he calls ‘counterinsurgency plus’ (Kilcullen, 2009; see also Kilcullen, 2005). This professedly 
benevolent strategy, however, inevitably entails the killing of both actual and suspected insurgents 
and terrorists – as well as, potentially, scores of innocent civilians.
Yet, counterinsurgency not only centres on a strategy of global triage but also seeks to triage 
targeted populations. The authors of the current field manual maintain that successful counterinsur-
gency efforts pivot on differentiating between an active minority supporting the insurgency, an 
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active minority opposing the insurgency, and a neutral or passive majority that can swing either 
way (US Department of the Army, 2007: 36). The main objective of the so-called population- 
centred or ‘hearts and minds’ variant of counterinsurgency is then to convince the passive majority 
to throw in their lot with the counterinsurgents.
However, in order to achieve the ultimate goal of winning over the majority of a targeted popu-
lation, soldiers and marines require a thorough understanding of a host nation’s culture and society. 
Apart from acting as soldiers, policemen, relief workers and spin doctors, soldiers and marines are 
also expected to become amateur social scientists, capable of producing knowledge not only about 
the insurgents but also about all aspects of the society in which they operate:
Intelligence in COIN is about people. U.S. forces must understand the people of the host nation, the 
insurgents, and the host-nation government. Commanders and planners require insight into cultures, 
perceptions, values, beliefs, interests and decision-making processes of individuals and groups…. All 
Soldiers and Marines collect information whenever they interact with the populace (US Department of the 
Army, 2007: 80).
We will now turn to some of the modes of knowledge (production) that are supposed to render the 
terrain – or rather the targets – of counterinsurgency intelligible.
Mapping the ‘human terrain’
Current doctrine was shaped not only by members of the armed forces but also by civilian academics, 
above all social scientists. The most prominent of them, cultural anthropologist Montgomery McFate 
(2005b: 47), co-author of the field manual’s chapter on intelligence, regular contributor to military 
publications and chief scientific consultant with the US Army’s Human Terrain System, argues:
Understanding foreign cultures and societies has become a national security priority. The more 
unconventional the adversary, the more we need to understand their society and underlying cultural 
dynamics. To defeat non-Western opponents who are transnational in scope, nonhierarchical in structure, 
clandestine in their approach, and operate outside of the context of nation-states, we need to improve our 
capacity to understand foreign cultures and societies.
In another article, published in Military Review, McFate (2005a: 24) deplores anthropology’s ‘bru-
tal process of self-flagellation’ and demands that the discipline should accept its role as ‘a warfight-
ing discipline’:
Once called ‘the handmaiden of colonialism,’ anthropology has had a long and fruitful relationship with 
various elements of national power, which ended suddenly following the Vietnam War. The strange story 
of anthropology’s birth as a warfighting discipline, and its sudden plunge into the abyss of postmodernism, 
is intertwined with the U.S failure in Vietnam. The curious and conspicuous lack of anthropology in the 
national-security arena since the Vietnam War has had grave consequences for countering the insurgency 
in Iraq, particularly because political policy and military operations based on partial and incomplete 
knowledge are often worse than none at all.
When, after initially successful invasions, the United States became embroiled in protracted 
insurgencies in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and US armed forces realized that they lacked the lin-
guistic and cultural competence for understanding the ‘operational environment’, ‘culture-centric 
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warfare’ became something of a mantra among officers and civilian security experts (Clemis, 
2009; Kipp et al., 2006; McFate, 2005a,b; McFate and Jackson, 2006; Renzi, 2006; see also 
Kienscherf, 2010).
From 2005, US armed forces have endeavoured to incorporate sociocultural knowledge and 
expertise into both doctrine and force structure. The 2006 Counterinsurgency Field Manual’s chapter 
on intelligence, which was co-authored by McFate, is peppered with social-scientific terms – such 
as ‘social networks’, ‘roles and statuses’, ‘social norms’, ‘taboo’, ‘culture’, ‘identity’, ‘narratives’, 
‘myths’, ‘beliefs’, ‘ideologies’ – that one would hardly expect to find in a military field manual (US 
Department of the Army, 2007: 79–135).3 The manual also contains an appendix entitled ‘Social 
network analysis and other analytical tools’ (US Department of the Army, 2007: 305–33). In fact, the 
observation that ‘intelligence in COIN is about people’, that successful operations require a thorough 
understanding of the human terrain, is constantly reiterated throughout the manual.
Between 2005 and 2006, the identified general need for sociocultural knowledge in counterin-
surgency operations and the particular absence of such expertise in the ongoing campaigns in Iraq 
and Afghanistan led to the launch of the so-called Human Terrain System. This programme was 
‘specifically designed to address cultural awareness shortcomings at the operational and tactical 
levels by giving brigade commanders an organic capability to help understand and deal with 
“human terrain” – the social, ethnographic, cultural, economic, and political elements of the people 
among whom a force is operating’ (Kipp et al., 2006: 9). The Human Terrain System aims to embed 
Human Terrain Teams consisting of between five and nine members into military units. These 
Human Terrain Teams are to be ‘composed of individuals with social science and operational back-
grounds that are deployed with tactical and operational military units to assist in bringing knowl-
edge about the local population into a coherent analytical framework and build relationships with 
the local power-brokers’ (Finney, 2008: 2). Human Terrain Teams combine social-network analysis 
with the geospatial analysis of human and physical geography in an effort to render the sociocul-
tural environment of insurgency intelligible, so that the military can differentiate between active 
supporters of the insurgency, a passive majority, and active supporters of the host-nation govern-
ment and its foreign backers (Finney, 2008; Kipp et al., 2006; US Department of the Army, 2007: 
36, 305–33).
However, a growing number of anthropologists firmly oppose what they see as ‘the weaponiza-
tion of anthropology’ (Feldman, 2009; González, 2007, 2009a,b; Sahlins, 2009). In 2007, a group 
of anthropologists set up the Network of Concerned Anthropologists to ‘take collective action and 
produce a statement of our objections to developing trends in the militarization of anthropology’ 
(González et al., 2009: 18). And in October 2009, the American Anthropological Association’s 
Commission on the Engagement of Anthropology with the US Security and Intelligence 
Communities (CEAUSSIC) unequivocally stated its disapproval of the participation of anthropolo-
gists in military operations (Albro et al., 2009).
Moreover, according to David Ucko (2009), the actual on-the-ground deployment of Human 
Terrain Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan proved to be fraught with difficulties. First of all, Ucko 
(2009: 166) maintains that the use of civilian Human Terrain Teams cannot solve the long-term 
problems associated with an ‘absence of an equivalent capability within the existing force struc-
ture’ – that is to say, the lack of linguistic and cultural skills among the military’s own specialist 
civil affairs personnel. Second, owing to the scarcity of ‘qualified volunteers’, the teams had to be 
‘placed at the brigade level rather than at the battalion or company level, where they might have 
had a greater impact’. Lastly, Ucko holds that since the members of Human Terrain Teams were 
often poorly trained and ‘the managerial practices and protocols governing their use and activity in 
a war zone were at times undefined’, they only produced knowledge of ‘varied quality’.
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The Human Terrain System was designed to enable the military to triage between different lev-
els of risk so that modes of both lethal and non-lethal targeting might be adapted accordingly. As 
Marshall Sahlins puts it, ‘the principal role of academics in the service of counterinsurgency is to 
develop the human intelligence (HUMINT) that will allow a triage between those elements of the 
population to be attacked (or assassinated) and those it would be better not to – in brief, sophisti-
cated targeting’ (Sahlins, 2009: vi; emphasis added).
In counterinsurgency, sociocultural knowledge thus serves the purpose of facilitating a triage 
within targeted populations that have already been singled out through the global triage of biopo-
litical liberal rule (Dillon and Reid, 2009). The objectives of biopolitics – namely, promoting spe-
cies-life and securing it from threats arising from within species-life – entail ‘modes of discrimination 
exercised at the level of the biological life of individuals and populations which are explicitly as 
well as implicitly racialized’ (Dillon and Reid, 2009: 133). However, liberal biopolitics cannot 
openly profess to privilege some aspects of the species over others purely on the basis of race:
Liberal biopolitics had therefore somehow to elide the ways in which all biopolitically driven regimes, 
including those at one time of liberal imperialism itself, are disposed to favour some aspects of the species 
over others, as a necessary consequence of seeking to promote the life of the species. (Dillon and Reid, 
2009: 49)
In other words, liberal governance can no longer triage between ‘safe’ and ‘dangerous’ species-life 
purely on racial grounds. Yet, the notion of culture, even if it remains implicitly racialized, is not 
nearly as politically suspect as the category of race. As Brad Evans (2010: 427) puts it, ‘racism is 
not what it used to be. Cultural fitness has now replaced biological heritage to contour the new 
lines of political struggle’.
A number of critics suggest that the use of sociocultural knowledge in counterinsurgency 
amounts to a new form of Orientalism (see Feldman, 2009; Gregory, 2008; Kienscherf, 2010). In 
its classical sense, Edward Said’s (1979) term Orientalism describes the complex and ambiguous 
historical interrelations between the production of knowledge about spaces and populations con-
strued as Oriental and the actual imperial project of establishing Western control over these spaces 
and populations. Montgomery McFate’s demand that anthropology should once again shoulder its 
responsibilities as a ‘warfighting’ discipline ‘ultimately amounts to saying that the discipline of 
anthropology should once again turn into a machine for the production of Orientalist discourse – 
something anthropologists have struggled against for many decades’ (Kienscherf, 2010: 135; see 
McFate, 2005a: 24).
In counterinsurgency, sociocultural knowledge about the Other ultimately serves to identify the 
circulation and enable the targeting of threatening species-life and thereby ends up producing and 
reinforcing both the conceptual and the physical borders between ‘us’ and ‘them’:
The emphasis on cultural difference – the attempt to hold the Other at a distance while claiming to cross 
the interpretive divide – produces a diagram in which violence has its origins in ‘their’ space, which the 
cultural turn endlessly partitions through its obsessive preoccupation with ethno-sectarian division, while 
the impulse to understand is confined to ‘our’ space, which is constructed as open, unitary, and generous. 
(Gregory, 2008: 11)
Moreover, the conceptual production and mapping of endlessly partitioned, internally divided and 
inherently dangerous spaces and populations bleeds into the actual physical division of these 
spaces and populations (Gregory, 2010).
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Securing and controlling the ‘human terrain’
Designing the physical environment in such a way as to make it possible to control flows of people 
and resources plays a fundamental part in the provision of security:
The logic of ‘security’ … presupposes that the danger is already inside, presented by a population in which 
subversive elements exist. The relation that ‘security’ implies between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’, as well as 
between military and police action, is ambiguous…. ‘Security’ conceives new spatial practices and 
arrangements. It erects barriers and channels and rechannels the flow of people and resources through 
space. According to the logic of security, only a constantly configured and reconfigured environment is a 
safe environment (Weizman, 2007: 106–7).
Counterinsurgency doctrine is designed to straddle the divide between policing and war-fight-
ing, in order to counter the complex threat of insurgents hiding among civilian populations. I have 
already discussed the Orientalist modes of knowledge (production) that counterinsurgents rely on 
in their attempts to differentiate between elements of the population. In examining some of the 
‘spatial practices and arrangements’ deployed in counterinsurgency, I will now show that the actual 
provision of security is based on efforts to control the movement of people and resources in space 
– efforts that derive from much older imperialist practices (Weizman, 2007: 107).
Attempts to control flows of people and resources frequently take the form of border regimes. 
Besides demarcating territory, borders are complex assemblages of tactics, technologies and forms 
of knowledge (production) that serve as instruments for tracking, targeting and managing the cir-
culation of people and goods. Thus, border assemblages are best described as sorting mechanisms 
aimed at distinguishing flows whose mobility needs to be facilitated from those that need to be 
interdicted (Lyon, 2008; Salter, 2005, 2008a,b).
In counterinsurgency, border assemblages, first of all, serve the traditional purpose of protecting 
the territorial integrity of the host nation. Above all, border control is supposed to deny insurgents 
cross-border support and sanctuary (Celeski, 2006: 51). But, border assemblages do not just aim to 
demarcate and protect the host-nation territory: counterinsurgents also seek to configure host-
nation space in such a way as to be able to separate the civilian population from the insurgents. 
Such practices have a profoundly imperialist genealogy. They were, in fact, a staple of 20th- 
century British imperial policing and French counter-revolutionary warfare, as well as US counter-
insurgency efforts in Vietnam (see Galula, 1964; Marshall, 2010; McClintock, 1992; Townshend, 
1986; Tyner, 2009: 97–104).
According to Alex Marshall (2010), the practices of British imperial policing and French coun-
ter-revolutionary warfare had a huge influence on the formation of contemporary counterinsur-
gency doctrine. Many counterinsurgency enthusiasts today tout the British practice of imperial 
policing as a viable model for current campaigns (see Crawshaw, 2007; Nagl, 2005). As Michael 
Crawshaw puts it in a paper published by the UK Defence Academy:
The ‘British Model’, tied as it is to the era of colonial counter-revolutionary war and earlier, is dated. 
Nevertheless, much of its methodology can be applied to modern insurgencies provided that there is a 
legitimate indigenous government capable of taking ownership of the campaign. (Crawshaw, 2007: 31 
emphasis in original)
Especially the so-called hearts-and-minds approach to counterinsurgency, which the British are 
widely held to have pioneered, is frequently heaped with praise in the counterinsurgency literature 
(see Long, 2006: 21–3).4
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The French model of counter-revolutionary warfare, moreover, differed from British imperial 
policing only in the extent ‘to which it sought not to maintain or manage the existing status quo, 
but rather to actively physically and mentally transform the societies concerned, in order to 
produce more loyal clients’ (Marshall, 2010: 242; emphasis in original). In the words of French 
veteran and counterinsurgency expert, David Galula (1964: 95), whose work also heavily informed 
the current US Counterinsurgency Field Manual, ‘the basic mechanism of counterinsurgency war-
fare … can be summed up in a single sentence: Build (or rebuild) a political machine from the 
population upwards’.
French policy centred on isolating the insurgents from the population. To this end, French coun-
terinsurgent forces sought to divide operational space into colour-coded zones, physically marked 
by fences, watchtowers, travel restrictions and infantry patrols: white for government-controlled 
areas; pink for contested zones; and red for insurgent-controlled areas. Accordingly, the task of the 
counterinsurgents was to turn pink areas white and red areas first pink and then white (Galula, 
1964: 49; Marshall, 2010: 243).
A strikingly similar approach was adopted during the ‘surge’ in Iraq: the cities of Baghdad and 
Ramadi were divided into sectors that ‘were subjected to intense yet discriminate infantry opera-
tions and were cordoned off with checkpoints and barriers; the population was issued identity 
cards, and any travel to and from the area was strictly controlled’ (Ucko, 2009: 128). Officers fre-
quently referred to these fenced-in neighbourhoods as ‘gated communities’ (Brulliard, 2007; 
Kilcullen, 2007). In his characteristic penchant for medical tropes, Kilcullen (2007) contends that, 
‘Gated Communities in counterinsurgency are like tourniquets in surgery’ – an effective, or so he 
claims, albeit somewhat painful, instrument for breaking the cycle of violence. He suggests that the 
‘gated communities’ approach can achieve this aim in three ways:
First, it makes it much harder for terrorists to infiltrate a community. We only establish perimeter security 
(checkpoints, T-walls, etc.) once the area has been cleared and secured, close relations are established with 
the population, and we have troops on the ground securing the district in conjunction with the people. Once 
the gated community goes in, this makes it much harder for extremists to re-enter.
Second, the perimeter controls make it much harder for terrorists to launch attacks from within that district, 
because they have to smuggle a car bomb or suicide vest out, through a limited number of controlled 
access points. This reduces extremists’ ability to use gated districts as a base to attack neighboring areas.
Third, if the terrorists do manage to mount an attack, the security controls protect the gated community 
against retaliation by ‘death squads’. This reduces fear within the community, alienates extremists from 
the population (since they can no longer pose as defenders) and emboldens people, who would otherwise 
be too intimidated, to tip off the security forces to enemy presence (Kilcullen, 2007).
Kilcullen’s account of gated communities in Iraq shows that once an area is cleared of insur-
gents, the population is subjected to a border regime so that the insurgents can be kept out. This 
regime takes the form of a complex assemblage of technologies (technologies of command, con-
trol, communication, surveillance and reconnaissance; biometrics; but also fences, walls, check-
points, etc.), modes of knowledge production (gathering of census data; mapping the physical and 
human terrain; etc.), organizations (US and allied military units; host-nation security forces; inter-
national aid organizations; etc.) and tactics (saturation patrols; raids; searches and seizures; enlist-
ing the help of the local community; etc.), geared towards permanently pacifying previously 
cleared spaces.
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Pacification efforts in counterinsurgency bear a closer resemblance to the high-intensity, and 
often also oppressive, policing of domestic crime hotspots than to conventional military opera-
tions. According to one RAND corporation analyst, ‘pacification is best thought of as a massively 
enhanced version of the “community policing” technique that emerged in the 1970s (encouraged 
in part by RAND research)’ (Long, 2006: 53). Indeed, in counterinsurgency operations, ‘low-
intensity warfare meets high-intensity policing’ (Hardt and Negri, 2004: 14–15).
In counterinsurgency, the installation of border assemblages is seen as an important step towards 
(re)building the infrastructure, or what Galula (1964: 95) called the ‘political machine’, necessary 
to permanently pacify and stabilize ungoverned spaces:
Population security, is the first requirement of success in counterinsurgency, but is not sufficient. Economic 
development, good governance, and the provision of essential services within a matrix of effective 
information operations, must all improve simultaneously and steadily over a long period of time if 
America’s determined insurgent enemies are to be defeated (Nagl, 2007: xix).
Current US doctrine seeks to rehabilitate older imperial, and highly oppressive, practices of 
population security, and to harness them to the imperatives of a new biopolitical imperialism that 
is not limited by the geostrategic objectives of individual nation-states, but rather driven by the 
potentially unlimited aims of promoting life while securing it from its own inherent threats.
Conclusion
Cutting across the fields of liberal war and liberal rule, counterinsurgency doctrine aims to promote 
certain forms of species-life while combating those that are deemed dangerous. Counterinsurgency 
doctrine seeks to articulate security and development into a governmental programme for pacify-
ing spaces and populations that are viewed as threats to the international system of (liberal) states, 
in order to eventually (re)integrate them into the networks of liberal governance. This programme 
has been designed and deployed in response to problematizations of (in)security that are both bio-
political and geostrategic. In fact, the very distinction between discourses of human security and 
US national security is meaningless in a security environment held to be marked by the global 
circulation of threats emanating from ungoverned spaces.
Counterinsurgency is set to triage between lives that need to be promoted and lives that need be 
destroyed within spaces and populations that have already been designated as dangerous by the 
global triage of liberal governance (Dillon and Reid, 2009: 91–4). What is more, the triage of tar-
geted populations is conducted on the basis of Orientalist modes of knowledge (production) and 
implemented through oppressive population-security measures that derive from the methods of 
imperial policing.
However, the use of such oppressive regimes of practices will likely continue to swell the ranks 
of ‘accidental guerrillas’, who see themselves as merely resisting foreign imperialist occupation, 
and will ultimately exacerbate the very symptoms of violence that counterinsurgency professes to 
be able to cure. Because of its biopolitical tendency to pathologize and depoliticize certain forms 
of violence, and despite its professed aim to address the legitimate grievances of targeted popula-
tions, counterinsurgency is unable to acknowledge the genuinely political grievance of foreign 
military occupation. And foreign occupation will likely breed more resentment and cause further 
instability that can easily spread across and beyond affected regions. The spread of instability, in 
turn, will only reinforce Western problematizations of human insecurity and may thus incite 
Western policymakers to embark on further pacification campaigns in the future. In short, 
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counterinsurgency doctrine is not so much a programme of global peace and stability as one of 
spatially and temporally indeterminate pacification. In fact, what was first known as the ‘war on 
terror’ and was then rebranded as the ‘Long War’ is now also often referred to as ‘Global 
Counterinsurgency’ or GCOIN (Bacevich, 2010; see also Kilcullen, 2005, 2009; Nagl, 2007).
Counterinsurgency’s (re)production of divisions between lives that are viewed as safe and those 
that are seen as threatening is perfectly in line with the broader discourse of human security. With 
their references to ‘bad neighbourhoods’, liberal proponents of human security, such as Mary 
Kaldor, also (re)produce divisions between ‘good’ liberal cosmopolitans and their ‘evil’ illiberal 
Others that can easily be colonized by more explicitly racialized discourses (see Kaldor, 1999, 
2003; Glasius and Kaldor, 2005; Kaldor and Beebe, 2010). This, in fact, is a consequence of a 
biopolitical logic ‘disposed to favour some aspects of the species over others’ (Dillon and Reid, 
2009: 49). And, ultimately, this disposition is what drives biopolitical imperialism and its pro-
grammes of global pacification.
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Notes
1. General McChrystal resigned (or was sacked) as commander of US and NATO forces in Afghanistan in 
July 2010 after disparaging remarks made by him and his staff about their civilian leaders appeared in a 
controversial Rolling Stone article (see Hastings, 2010). McChrystal was replaced by General David 
Petraeus, who is considered one of the chief architects of current US counterinsurgency doctrine.
2. Marja was repeatedly referred to as a town in the Western media. US investigative journalist Gareth 
Porter (2010), however, pointed out that Marja ‘was an agricultural area whose population of about 
35,000 was spread over some 120 square kilometres’. This is also borne out by Google Maps’ satellite 
views of the area.
3. David Price revealed that the definitions of basic social science terms in Chapter Three of the manual, 
entitled ‘Intelligence in counterinsurgency’, were based on ‘pilfered scholarship’. Apparently, the manual 
has ‘borrowed’ terms, phrases and even entire paragraphs from a large number of unacknowledged 
sources (see Price, 2009, 2007).
4. However, Marshall (2010: 241) argues that British imperial policing was not nearly as focused on the 
‘hearts and minds’ of the population as some of its contemporary adherents claim: ‘In practice, British 
methods remained above all reliant upon the threat of the maximum use of force, and included such tech-
niques as crowd control via the use of indiscriminate volley fire, ethnic displacement, mass floggings and 
torture, the poisoning of wells and burning of villages, the napalm area bombing of Malayan forests, and 
the creation of “free fire” zones – all conducted under extremely permissive legal constraints.’
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